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Abstract
This study investigates strategies in reasoning about mental states of others, a process that requires theory of mind. It is a
first step in studying the cognitive basis of such reasoning, as strategies affect tradeoffs between cognitive resources.
Participants were presented with a two-player game that required reasoning about the mental states of the opponent.
Game theory literature discerns two candidate strategies that participants could use in this game: either forward reasoning
or backward reasoning. Forward reasoning proceeds from the first decision point to the last, whereas backward reasoning
proceeds in the opposite direction. Backward reasoning is the only optimal strategy, because the optimal outcome is known
at each decision point. Nevertheless, we argue that participants prefer forward reasoning because it is similar to causal
reasoning. Causal reasoning, in turn, is prevalent in human reasoning. Eye movements were measured to discern between
forward and backward progressions of fixations. The observed fixation sequences corresponded best with forward
reasoning. Early in games, the probability of observing a forward progression of fixations is higher than the probability of
observing a backward progression. Later in games, the probabilities of forward and backward progressions are similar,
which seems to imply that participants were either applying backward reasoning or jumping back to previous decision
points while applying forward reasoning. Thus, the game-theoretical favorite strategy, backward reasoning, does seem to
exist in human reasoning. However, participants preferred the more familiar, practiced, and prevalent strategy: forward
reasoning.
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Introduction
Having a theory of mind (ToM) allows us to reason about other
people’s mental states, their knowledge, beliefs, desires, and
intentions. This ability is helpful in social interactions, especially
when our outcomes depend on the actions of others, and vice
versa. Many studies have focused on the age at which ToM
develops [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], the proficiency of humans and
nonhumans in ToM tasks [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14],
and the brain regions associated with ToM [15], [16], [17]. In
contrast, few studies have focused on the cognitive basis of ToM
[18], [19]. Consequently, little is known about how inferences
about mental states are achieved.
As findings from cognitive neuroscience have shown that
participants in ToM tasks employ many brain regions rather than
one single ‘‘ToM module’’ [15], [16], [17], [18], ToM reasoning
probably consists of multiple serial and concurrent cognitive
processes. Cost-benefit tradeoffs between these various resources
will most likely have cascading effects on cognitive load [20] and
thus ToM reasoning. Both task setting and strategies, in turn, have
been shown to affect cost-benefit tradeoffs between cognitive
resources [21], [22], [23]. Therefore, the study of strategies and
task setting might be an appropriate first step in the study of the
cognitive basis of ToM reasoning [24], [25].
In this study, we investigate the ongoing process of ToM
reasoning in a two-player game, referred to as Marble Drop [11],
[12], see Figure 1. In this game, a white marble is about to drop,
and each player’s goal is that the white marble drops into the bin
that contains the darkest possible marble of his or her allocated
color. This is commonly known among the players. Both players
can remove trapdoors to control the path of the white marble.
Marble Drop requires ToM because each player’s outcomes
depend on the decisions of the other player.
The example games in Figure 1 are of varying difficulty. With
each additional decision point (i.e., set of trapdoors), the required
reasoning becomes more complex. The game in Figure 1c is the
most difficult, and requires second-order ToM. Below, we provide
a possible reasoning scenario to explain how second-order ToM
comes into play in this particular game.
By looking at payoff-pairs A to D in the game in Figure 1c,
Player 1 will find out that B contains the darkest marble of his
allocated color, blue. Player 1 has to ask himself whether that
marble is attainable. In other words, Player 1 has to reason about
whether Player 2 would remove the left orange trapdoor.
Therefore, Player 1 has to look at the orange marbles in B to D
to find out that D contains Player 29s darkest orange marble. ToM
reasoning continues with Player 1 asking himself whether Player 2
thinks her orange marble in D is attainable. In other words, Player
1 has to reason about whether Player 2 thinks that he, Player 1,
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would remove the right blue trapdoor of the rightmost set of
trapdoors. Player 1 knows that he would not remove that
trapdoor, but that he would remove the left one instead. He also
knows that Player 2 is aware of this, as both players are aware of
each other’s goals. Therefore, Player 1 knows that Player 2 knows
that her darkest orange marble in D is unattainable. Therefore,
Player 1 has to go back to the second decision point (i.e., the
orange trapdoors). There, Player 2 would compare the orange
marbles in B and C and decide to remove the left orange trapdoor,
because the orange marble in B is the darkest orange marble that
she can still attain. To conclude, Player 1 knows that his darkest
blue marble in B is attainable, and will thus remove the right blue
trapdoor of the leftmost set of trapdoors.
According to game theory literature there is just one strategy
that undoubtedly yields the optimal outcome: reasoning by
backward induction. We will refer to this strategy simply as backward
reasoning. Backward reasoning proceeds from the last decision to
be made back to original problem or situation [26]. The last
decision in the game in Figure 1c is Player 19s decision between
the blue marbles in payoff-pairs C and D. Player 1 would decide to
remove the left trapdoor because C contains the darker blue
marble. Backward reasoning would then proceed with the second-
to-last decision, which is Player 29s decision between the orange
marbles in payoff-pairs B and C. Player 2 would decide to remove
the left orange trapdoor, because B contains the darker orange
marble. Backward reasoning stops at the third-to-last decision,
which is Player 19s decision between the blue marbles in payoff-
pairs A and B. Player 1 would remove the right blue trapdoor,
because B contains the darker blue marble. This scenario shows
that backward reasoning is very efficient, because the optimal
outcome is known at each decision point. Accordingly, few
reasoning steps need to be retained, and working memory load
would be small.
Game theory literature discerns another possible strategy,
forward reasoning, but this strategy is not guaranteed to yield the
optimal outcome [24], [27]. Opposite to backward reasoning, the
forward reasoning strategy starts at the first decision point in a
game and blindly proceeds to the next for as long as higher
outcomes are expected to be available at future decision points. A
drawback of this strategy is that a player might not recognize the
highest attainable outcome and continues the game to future
decision points with lower outcomes. However, occasionally
forward reasoning yields a quick solution, for example, if the
maximum outcome is available at the first decision point.
Even though backward reasoning is the optimal strategy in
games such as Marble Drop, it does not seem to be ubiquitous in
human reasoning. In contrast, a forward progression seems to be
more prevalent, for example in causal reasoning, where causes or
decisions lead to possible effects. A well-known example of the
persistency of causal reasoning is the fundamental attribution error,
where causal explanations of observed behaviors are often
dispositional despite more appropriate situational explanations
[28], [29].
Given the prevalence of a forward direction in human
reasoning, we expect that forward reasoning might also be a
viable candidate strategy in Marble Drop games, even though
backward reasoning is the game-theoretical favorite. However,
forward reasoning would not always suffice to achieve the optimal
outcome in Marble Drop. As explained above, a player might
discover, while reasoning forwardly, that he or she unknowingly
skipped the highest attainable outcome at a previous decision
point. Thus, the player would need to jump back to inspect
whether that outcome is indeed attainable. The procedure of
jumping back to previous decision points is called backtracking [30].
Backtracking superficially resembles backward reasoning, but it
differs because jumping back to a previous decision point can be
followed up with forward reasoning again. Note that our
explanation of the Marble Drop game in Figure 1c followed the
procedure of forward reasoning plus backtracking. Forward
reasoning plus backtracking is less efficient than backward
reasoning, because (at most stages in a game) multiple possible
outcomes need to be retained to compare against next possible
outcomes. Consequently, this strategy would cause high working
memory load.
Besides the question which strategy is preferred (i.e., backward
reasoning or forward reasoning plus backtracking), we investigate
whether strategy preference can be influenced by task factors. The
latter question is inspired by the work of Hedden and Zhang [9].
An important but also criticized aspect of that study was that each
participant (assigned to the role of Player 1) was asked to predict
the decision of Player 2 first, before making a decision [31]. As this
procedure prompts perspective taking, ToM reasoning might not
have been completely spontaneous [31], [9], [32]. In fact, we have
shown that prompting participants for predictions indeed has a
positive effect on performance [11], [12]. In the current study, we
investigate whether prompting may also have an effect on
participants’ preferences for any of the strategies.
Because Marble Drop has a predominantly visual interface and
both strategies clearly predict a distinct succession in which the
Figure 1. Examples of zero-order (a), first-order (b), and second-order (c) Marble Drop games. Each bin contains a pair of marbles,
labeled A to D. For each player, the goal is that the white marble drops into the bin that contains the darkest possible marble of his or her allocated
color. In this example, Player 19s marbles are blue, and Player 29s marbles are orange. Player 1 controls the blue trapdoors and Player 2 controls the
orange trapdoors. The dashed diagonal lines represent the trapdoors that the players should decide to remove to obtain their maximum payoffs in
these particular games.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.g001
Theory of Mind and Eye Movements
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 September 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 9 | e45961
payoffs are to be compared, we employed eye tracking to measure
the online (i.e., ongoing) process of ToM reasoning. Eye tracking
has been used extensively in visual search tasks and reading tasks
[33], [34], and in complex visual problem solving tasks [35], [36].
These studies have shown correlations between eye movements,
on the one hand, and cognitive processes and higher-level
strategies, on the other hand. For example, Kong et al. [35]
found a strong correlation between participants’ visual working
memory capacity and their eye movements while solving a
nontrivial problem-solving task, the traveling salesman problem.
Eye tracking has also been proven successful in exposing strategies
in another complex (but non-social) reasoning task [36]. Based on
the eye movements of participants that played the game of SET,
Nyamsuren and Taatgen [36] were able to distinguish between
bottom-up visual processes and top-down planning processes.
They were also able to detect in-game strategy shifts in
participants.
An advantage of eye tracking is that it is an unobtrusive
measure; participants were not constrained in any other way than
in the original task setting. In contrast, other studies on online
ToM reasoning required task modifications that may have
influenced participants’ strategies. For example, in Johnson,
Camerer, Sen, and Rymon’s computer task [37], participants
had to uncover task-relevant information that was hidden behind
boxes displayed on the computer screen. The participants had to
move the mouse cursor over a box to reveal the information
behind it. Consequently, they might have felt disinclined to
repeatedly move around the cursor to inspect each box’s content.
Tracking the eye movements (with a desk-mounted eye tracker)
does not constrain participants so much.
In sum, the literature has identified one optimal strategy
(backward reasoning), and we propose another (forward reasoning
plus backtracking). Both strategies are clearly distinct from each
other. This study aims to identify which strategy explains
participants’ performance in a ToM task best. It also investigates
whether prompting participants for predictions has an effect on their
strategies. We use eye tracking because it is an appropriate tool for
showing whether the general direction of the eye movements, and
thus reasoning, is either forward or backward.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The Ethical Committee Psychology (ECP) of the University of
Groningen approved this study. Written informed consent as
approved by the ECP was obtained from each participant before
conducting the experiment.
Participants
Twenty-three first-year psychology students (14 female) with a
mean age of 20.8 years (ranging from 18 to 24 years) participated
in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity. None of the participants had
difficulties distinguishing between the colors (blue and orange)
presented in the experiment1.
Stimuli
Instead of using numerical payoffs, which are commonly used in
strategic games, we chose for colored marbles to counter
numerical but non-optimal strategies such as, for example,
minimizing the opponent’s outcomes, or maximizing the differ-
ence in Player 1 and Player 2 outcomes.
Payoffs. The payoffs were marbles of 4 different shades that
could be ordered from light to dark. The colors of the marbles
were shades of orange and blue, taken from the HSV (i.e., hue,
saturation and value) space. A sequential color palette was
computed by varying saturation, for a given hue and value. This
resulted in 4 shades (with saturation from.2 to 1) for both of the
colors orange (hue = .1, value = 1) and blue (hue = .6, value = 1).
The participants did not have any difficulties distinguishing
between the shades of either color.
Payoff structures. The payoff structure (i.e., configuration of
payoffs) and strategy preference determine the complexity of the
reasoning required of Player 1, the participant. For example, a
forward reasoning Player 1 immediately knows what to do if
payoff-pair A contains his darkest marble: stop the game (i.e.,
remove the left-side trapdoor). In this case, Player 1 does not have
to reason about Player 29s reasoning about Player 1. Therefore, we
excluded this payoff structure, as it cannot inform us about second-
order ToM. We only selected payoff structures that required
Player 1 to reason about the decision at each of the three decision
points (i.e., sets of trapdoors).
In line with Hedden and Zhang’s criteria [9], we considered
payoff structures to be diagnostic of second-order ToM reasoning
if, at the first set of trapdoors, second-order reasoning yielded a
decision opposite to a decision based on first-order ToM
reasoning. The payoff structures were balanced for the number
of correct decisions to remove the left/right trapdoor, for both
Player 1 and Player 2. The payoff structures are provided in
Material S1.
Design
The experiment consisted of three blocks: a training block and
two test blocks. The training block was meant to familiarize
participants with the rules of Marble Drop. In the first test block
we manipulated whether participants were prompted to predict
Player 29s decision. The first test block was followed by a second
one, in which none of the participants had to make predictions
anymore. This block was meant to measure the longevity of the
effect of prompting participants for predictions.
Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a 20-inch computer monitor,
at 70 cm distance. An Eyelink 1000 eye-tracker was used to record
the eye movements of the dominant eye, at a sample-rate of
500 Hz. The eye tracker was calibrated to each participant’s
dominant eye. Participants were always assigned to the role of
Player 1. The target color, either blue or orange (marbles and
trapdoors), was counterbalanced between participants. Partici-
pants were instructed that their goal was to maximize their payoffs,
that is, to attain the darkest possible marble of their target color.
Participants were told truthfully that they were playing against a
computer-simulated Player 22, whose goal was to maximize its
payoffs. Participants were also instructed that the computer was
programmed to look ahead and take into account the participant’s
1The experiment was preceded by a block of 20 trials in which participants had to
distinguish between the colors blue and orange, and between different shades of
the colors blue and orange. They performed up to ceiling (M=0.99, SE ,.01),
which implies that the participants did not have any difficulties distinguishing
between colors and shades of colors.
2Knowing whether the opponent was a computer player did not have an effect in
Hedden and Zhang’s [9] study.
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last possible decision (i.e., Player 19s decision at the last set of
trapdoors).
In the training block, participants were presented with 20 games
of increasing difficulty. To familiarize the participants with the
setup of the Marble Drop games, participants were first presented
four trivial two-bin games that did not require ToM reasoning
(Figure 1a). These two-bin games were followed by a set of eight
three-bin games (Figure 1b), and a set of eight four-bin games
(Figure 1c). The three-bin games require first-order ToM, because
the participants have to reason about the decision of Player 2 at
the second decision point (i.e., set of trapdoors). As discussed
earlier, the four-bin games require second-order ToM. Each
training game was played until either the participant or the
computer decided to stop the game, by removing the left-side
trapdoor, or until the last possible decision was made. After each
game, participants were presented feedback displaying either
‘‘correct’’ if they obtained the darkest possible marble, or
‘‘incorrect’’ if they failed to do so. The feedback never indicated
why a response was incorrect. Thus, participants had to find out
themselves why an incorrect decision was incongruent with the
other player’s mental state. As the participants’ performance on
the eight four-bin games is indicative of their pre-experimental
level of second-order ToM reasoning, we have included these
items in the analyses.
Prompting participants for predictions was manipulated in the
first test block, which consisted solely of second-order games.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the so-called Prompt
group (10 participants), or the so-called No-Prompt group (13
participants). Participants in the Prompt group were asked to enter
their prediction of Player 29s decision at the second decision point
before they were asked to enter their own decision at the first
decision point. Participants in the No-prompt group were not
explicitly asked to make any predictions. In this block, games
stopped immediately after entering a decision. Feedback was
presented after entering a prediction, if a prediction was queried,
and after entering a decision. Feedback mentioned only whether a
response was (in)correct. The first test block consisted of 32 trials;
each of the 16 payoff structures was presented twice. The order
was randomized.
The second test block was similar to the first one except that
none of the participants were explicitly queried for a prediction
anymore. This block also consisted of 32 trials.
Results and Discussion
Behavioral Results
Figure 2 depicts the mean accuracy of participants playing
second-order Marble Drop games. The mean accuracy scores
were analyzed by means of repeated-measures ANOVA. Howev-
er, the scores were first arcsine-transformed to preserve homoge-
neity of variance. The analysis included the between-subjects
factor prompting (No-prompt/Prompt) and the within-subjects factor
block (Test Block 1/Test Block 2).
In contrast to our earlier work [12], the factor prompting was not
significant, F(1, 21) = .1, ns. On average, asking participants to
predict Player 29s decision did not (positively) influence their
performance. The lack of an overall effect of prompting might have
been due to ceiling effects, as the mean accuracy was very high,
around 90% in both test blocks.
The interaction between prompting and block was significant: F(1,
21) = 4.61, p = .044. On average, accuracy increased from Test
Block 1 to Test Block 2, F(1, 21) = 5.09, p= .035, but that effect
was mainly due to increasing accuracy in the No-prompt group. A
possible explanation for the interaction might be that participants
in the Prompt group, in contrast to participants in the No-prompt
group, had to adjust to an experimental procedure that changed
with each subsequent test block. This could have hindered their
performance, which did not significantly differ between the two
test blocks, t(9) = .12, ns.
Eye Tracking Results
Eye movements were measured to distinguish between the
strategies that participants may have used in second-order Marble
Drop games, as backward and forward reasoning would clearly yield
distinctive successions of fixations on each player’s payoffs. The
default parameters of the Eyelink 1000 eye tracker were used to
Figure 2. Mean accuracy in No-prompt and Prompt conditions,
depicted separately for test blocks 1 and 2. Error bars
represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.g002
Figure 3. Example of a participant’s fixations in a particular
game. The succession of fixations is indicated by arrows, which are
superimposed on the payoffs and trapdoors (i.e., decision points). The
first 15 fixations are depicted in black, fixations 16–30 in red, fixations
31–45 in green, and fixations 46–61 are depicted in blue. The succession
of fixations on payoffs and trapdoors seems to indicate forward
reasoning, followed by backtracking, which is indicated by the blue
arrows that eventually go back to the first payoff pair.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.g003
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extract fixations from the eye movement data. Figure 3 gives an
example of a participant’s succession of fixations in a particular
game.
Each pair of payoffs was considered to be an area of interest
(AOI). However, we did not define fixed AOIs with specific x and
y coordinates. As the AOIs corresponding with the payoff-pairs are
relatively small, a slightly inaccurate calibration of the eye tracker
to a participant’s dominant eye would shift his or her fixations
outside of the AOIs. Therefore, cluster analysis was used to find
four clusters of fixations in each participant’s dataset, each cluster
corresponding to a payoff-pair. The clustering algorithm used was
a more robust version of k-means clustering [38]. Fixations in the
first (i.e., leftmost) cluster were labeled with the letter A; fixations in
the second cluster were labeled with the letter B, and so forth. The
labels are depicted above the payoff-pairs in Figure 1c. All
following analyses solely include fixations that fall within these
AOIs.
Onset times of fixations on payoff-pairs. We analyzed the
in-game times at which each cluster (i.e., payoff-pair) was first
fixated, as these so-called onset times may indicate a general
direction of reasoning in second-order Marble Drop games. The
onset times were averaged across trials, separately for each
participant (i.e., the 8 second-order trials from the practice block,
and 32 trials from test block 2). The onset times were log-
transformed, because their distribution was skewed to the right.
The mean onset times (across participants) are depicted in Figure 4.
We collapsed the data across the Prompt group and the No-prompt
group, as there were no significant differences between these
groups.
Figure 4a shows monotonically increasing onset times in the
practice block, which indicates a forward (i.e., left-to-right) general
direction of reasoning. All pairwise comparisons are significant,
AB: p,.001; AC: p,.001; AD: p,.001; BC: p=,.001; BD:
p,.001; CD: p= .028. The p-values are corrected by means of the
Bonferroni-Holm method [39] to account for family-wise error
rate.
Presumably, participants’ strategies were most stable near the
end of the experiment. However, the timing of the first fixations on
each payoff-pair does not inform us on what these strategies might
have been (see Figure 4b). The onset times do not increase
monotonically anymore, in contrast to the onset times in the
practice block. However, payoff-pairs A and B are still fixated
earlier than payoff-pairs C and D. The average difference in onset
times is significant, t(45) =22.76, p = .008.
As the onset times do not strongly correspond with either one of
the candidate strategies, we analyzed the entire fixation sequences,
which might reveal patterns corresponding to backward and/or
forward reasoning.
Fixation sequences. Before presenting the statistics on the
entire fixation sequences, we will first explain the statistical
procedure, which involves several steps.
For each game, we predicted which payoffs would be fixated,
and in which succession, given a particular strategy. The left panel
of Figure 5 depicts an example game, the middle panel depicts
fixation sequences that were predicted on the basis of backward
reasoning, and the right panel depicts fixation sequences that were
predicted on the basis of forward reasoning plus backtracking. For
illustrative purposes, fixations on Player 29s marbles were labeled
with lowercase letters a, b, c, and d, and fixations on Player 19s
marbles with uppercase letters A, B, C, and D. Each line in the last
two panels of Figure 5 represents a possible sequence of fixations
given the corresponding strategy.
Backward reasoning yields eight possible fixation sequences for
each individual game. Namely, a comparison between two payoffs
can yield two possible successions of fixations, for example ,D,
C. versus ,C, D., and there are three comparisons to be made
when applying backward reasoning. Thus, there is a total of two to
the power of three, which is eight, possible fixation sequences. We
granted forward reasoning plus backtracking the same degrees of
freedom by applying the same procedure to the backtracking part,
which is essentially the same as backward reasoning.
Given that we predicted fixations on individual marbles, we had
to label each observed fixation for the specific marble that was
fixated. We used cluster analyses to find two sub-clusters within
each of the previously found payoff-pair clusters. Each left-side
sub-cluster was considered to contain fixations on Player 19s
marbles, and each right-side sub-cluster was considered to contain
fixations on Player 29s marbles.
It is important to note that our implementations of the two
strategies are idealizations, as we did not implement cognitive
constraints such as, for example, working memory capacity.
Consequently, the predicted fixation sequences did not contain
repetitions. In contrast, the observed fixations sequences did contain
repetitions, as participants would re-fixate payoffs if they had
forgotten previously attended payoffs and comparisons. Figure 3
Figure 4. The logarithm of the onset times (in msec) of fixations on each payoff-pair. The onset times are depicted separately for the
practice block (a) and Test Block 2 (b). The error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.g004
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clearly shows an example of a participant repeatedly fixating
payoffs. We accounted for these memory effects by collapsing
repeating patterns in the observed fixation sequences. For
example, both AAaBbCd and AaAaBbCd would collapse to
AaBbCd.
To evaluate how closely our predicted fixation sequences match
the observed fixation sequences, we calculated the Levenshtein
distance, which is the minimal number of insertions, deletions, and
substitutions to get from one sequence to another. For example, if
an observed fixation sequence for the game in Figure 5 would
consist of AOIs ,D, d, C, c, b, B, A., we would find strong
evidence in favor of backward reasoning, as it differs only one
fixation (i.e., d) from one of the predicted sequences of AOIs ,D,
C, c, b, B, A.. Importantly, the observed fixation sequence is
compared with a set of eight predicted fixation sequences, thus
eight Levenshtein distances are calculated, and the minimum
Levenshtein distance is taken. To account for varying lengths of
observed and predicted fixation sequences, the Levenshtein
distance is normalized by dividing it by the length of whichever
of the two sequences is longer, either the observed or the predicted
one.
According to the procedure described above, the normalized
Levenshtein distance was calculated for each individual trial (i.e.,
32 trials per participant per test block). The normalized
Levenshtein distance was averaged across trials, separately for
each participant. Figure 6 depicts the mean normalized Levensh-
tein distance in Test Block 2, in which strategy preference is most
stable.
We collapsed the data across the No-prompt group and the Prompt
group, as the eye movement patterns did not significantly differ
between these groups. Both the main effect of prompting and the
interaction between strategy and prompting were not significant, F(1,
21) = .46, ns, and F(1, 21) = .71, ns, respectively. There are two
possible explanations for this: Either prompting participants for
predictions did not affect their strategy preference, or participants
in the No-prompt group developed similar strategies on their own.
Figure 6 shows that, on average, the observed fixation sequences
are most similar to the fixation sequences predicted on the basis of
forward reasoning plus backtracking. The normalized Levenshtein
distance is significantly larger for predictions based on backward
reasoning, t(22) = 5.64, p,0.001. Figure 6 also depicts a baseline
measure (dotted line), which is the average normalized Levensh-
tein distance between observed fixation sequences, on the one
hand, and each sequence randomized, on the other hand.
Randomized sequences contain the same frequency of fixations
as their observed counterparts, but nevertheless, forward reasoning
plus backtracking fits the observed behavior significantly better
than the baseline measure, t(22) = 4.91, p,0.001.
Sub-patterns in the fixation sequences. To get a better
idea of which specific components of the hypothesized strategies
describe participants’ reasoning best, we performed exploratory
statistics on sub-patterns in the fixation data. The analysis
concerns the fixation data from Test Block 2, as participants’
strategies are assumed to be most stable in that test block. We will
first describe the procedure of extracting sub-patterns from the
fixation sequences, and then provide the results.
We analyzed sub-patterns of three subsequent fixations, as three
is the minimal number of fixations that makes a pattern
informative of either a forward or backward succession of
comparisons between marbles. For example, subsequent fixations
on payoff-pairs C, D, and B unambiguously indicate a backward
succession of comparisons, even though the first two fixations seem
to indicate a forward succession.
All subsequent triplets of fixations were extracted from each
individual fixation sequence. If, for example, a trial consisted of
Figure 5. An example second-order Marble Drop game (left panel), and associated fixation sequences predicted on the basis of
backward reasoning (middle panel) and forward reasoning plus backtracking (right panel). The fixation sequences represented by the
black lines are annotated for AOI (A – D; a – d), and those represented by the grey lines are not. Player 19s payoffs are labeled with uppercase A, B, C,
and D. Player 29s payoffs are labeled with lowercase a, b, c, and d. The sequences are depicted on ‘‘eye movement paths’’ for illustrative purposes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.g005
Figure 6. The average normalized Levenshtein distance
between the observed sequence, on the one hand, and the
closest of the set of predicted sequences, on the other hand.
The dotted line is considered a baseline measure, which is the average
normalized Levenshtein distance between an observed sequence and
its randomized version. The error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.g006
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fixations on payoff-pairs CDBCAB, sub-patterns CDB, DBC,
BCA, and CAB were extracted. We considered fixations on
payoff-pairs instead of fixations on individual payoffs (e.g., C
versus c), as the latter would yield too many combinations with
very low frequencies.
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 1, which
shows the 50% most frequent forward and backward triplets. As can
be seen in Table 1, the 50% most frequent triplets contain as many
forward as backward triplets, and the frequencies of these triplets
are quite similar. This seems to imply that, on average,
participants made as many forward as backward comparisons
between marbles.
We also analyzed the (in-game) onset times of forward and
backward triplets, as these help us to determine whether forward
and backward comparisons were made alternately, or forward
comparisons first, followed by backward comparisons. Figure 7
depicts the relative likelihood (or probability density function) of
onset times of all the triplets, and thus the likelihood of observing a
particular triplet at a particular time in a game. Figure 7 clearly
shows that all forward triplets have a relatively high likelihood of
being observed early in a game, between zero and two seconds,
whereas the highest likelihood of observing backward triplets is
distributed over the entire range of 0 to 5 seconds.
Backward triplets correspond with either backward reasoning or
the backtracking part of forward reasoning, depending on onset
time. Early onset times would indicate backward reasoning,
whereas late onset times would indicate backtracking. Figure 7
clearly shows that the densities of the backward triplets have less
prominent peaks than the densities of the forward triplets. The flat
likelihood distribution ranging from 0 to 5 seconds seems to imply
that, at least in some games, backward reasoning was applied
(indicated by early onsets). The finding that after 2 seconds the
density functions of forward triplets are similar to those of the
backward triplets implies that forward and backward comparisons
were made equally often, presumably in alternating sequence.
Figure 3 shows an example of such a pattern.
In sum, the densities in Figure 7 correspond best with the
forward reasoning plus backtracking strategy. Given that the
proportions of forward and backward triplets are quite similar, we
can conclude that at early onset times forward triplets are more
probable to be observed than backward triplets. In other words,
payoffs are most likely to be compared in a forward succession
until the last decision point is reached. Thereafter, backtracking
takes place if the optimal outcome appears to be available at an
earlier decision point. This succession, of forward comparisons
followed by backward comparisons can be iterated multiple times
until the highest attainable outcome is ascertained.
General Conclusions
We investigated strategy preference in a ToM task. Therefore, it
was crucial that our task was successful at capturing ToM
reasoning. Fortunately, mean accuracy was around 90%, close to
ceiling, which means that the participants successfully applied
(second-order) ToM in a large proportion of the trials (i.e., Marble
Drop games).
Eye movements were measured to discern two candidate
strategies with opposite general directions of reasoning: backward
reasoning and forward reasoning plus backtracking. The onset times of
the first fixations on each payoff-pair seem to imply that, in the
practice block, participants compared the payoffs in a forward
succession. We analyzed the entire fixation sequences in the
second test block and found that the forward reasoning plus
backtracking strategy described the fixation sequences best. The
observed fixation sequences were more similar to the fixation
sequences predicted on the basis of forward reasoning plus
backtracking than to the fixation sequences predicted on the basis
of backward reasoning. Furthermore, by looking at sub-patterns in
the fixation data, we found that, early in games, the likelihood of
observing forward successions of comparisons between payoffs is
higher than the likelihood of observing backward comparisons.
These findings suggest that participants were applying forward
reasoning, even though backward reasoning is the game-theoret-
ical favorite strategy.
A possible explanation for a stronger preference for forward
reasoning plus backtracking might be that backward reasoning
requires deep structural knowledge of the task. Fu and Gray [21]
argued that in many interactive tasks, experts’ behavior is rather
dependent on, or even driven by, surface characteristics. Thus, the
strong spatial and temporal structure of our task might have had a
role in the adoption of forward reasoning (plus backtracking). Both
the task display and the physics in Marble Drop games strengthen
Table 1. The 50% most frequent forward and backward
fixation triplets.
Triplet Proportion










The frequency of each triplet was divided by the total number of triplets,
n = 6126, yielding the proportions given in the last column.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.t001
Figure 7. Densities of onset times of forward (blue) and
backward (orange) triplets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045961.g007
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the intuitive and chronological direction of progressing decision
points and comparing payoffs in a forward succession. Further
research is needed to determine to what extent similar, or other,
surface features might encourage the adoption of other strategies.
One could argue against forward reasoning by saying that the
left-to-right (i.e., forward) fixations on the payoff-pairs merely
represent a ‘scanning phase’ in which the payoffs are explored.
However, this explanation does not hold since the participants
kept fixating on the decision points (i.e., trapdoors) throughout the
entire experiment. In fact, the fixations on the payoffs seemed to
be interleaved with fixations on the trapdoors. Figure 3 provides
an example of this pattern. For scanning purposes only, fixations
on trapdoors are unlikely given that the trapdoors did not vary
during the entire experiment (whereas the marbles did vary with
each game). A more realistic and functional explanation for
fixating trapdoors is reasoning, for example, about ‘‘what would
happen if the other player opened the left trapdoor’’.
To conclude, ToM reasoning in games such as Marble Drop
seems to progress in a forward succession, from causes (or possible
decisions) to possible effects. Lacking a deep structural under-
standing of the logical problems posed in Marble Drop games,
participants preferred to use a well-learned strategy, very similar to
causal reasoning, even though it was not the most efficient strategy
in this context.
Supporting Information
Material S1 The payoff structures that were used in the
experiment. Player 19s predictions and decisions are
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